Fellowship Dinners Australia

Executive Summary

What if the United States is fighting the wrong war in Iran—not because it is using the wrong tools, but because it lacks the courage to pursue the only objective that matters?

This article argues that anything short of regime change in Tehran is strategically doomed, and that decades of failed negotiations have only strengthened Iran’s hand. The article, by Dr David Bennett, makes the case that the real danger lies not only in Iran’s advancing nuclear ambitions, but in Washington’s hesitation.

Drawing lessons from Ukraine and Iraq, it contends that a rapid, technology-driven intervention—combined with a swift political transition—could achieve decisive results while avoiding the mistakes of the past. The alternative, it warns, is a far more dangerous world in which Iran emerges as a nuclear power, with consequences that could spiral far beyond the Middle East.

The current United States military campaign in Iran is likely to fail—not because of a lack of military capability, but because its objective is fundamentally inadequate. Anything short of regime change in Tehran risks prolonging the conflict while allowing the Iranian leadership to outmanoeuvre Washington, as it has done for nearly half a century.

For decades, Iran’s ruling ayatollahs have demonstrated a consistent ability to manipulate negotiations to their advantage, extracting concessions while conceding little. There is little reason to believe that the current round of diplomacy will produce a different outcome. Meanwhile, Tehran’s refusal to credibly abandon its nuclear ambitions speaks volumes. This is a regime that intends to acquire nuclear weapons—and to use them as instruments of regional domination.

The threat is no longer theoretical. Iran has already demonstrated the capability to project ballistic missiles into Europe, and there is growing concern that it may soon be able to reach the United States. The implications are stark: a nuclear-armed Iran would not only threaten Israel, but also destabilise the entire Middle East, including key Muslim Arab states.

Against this backdrop, the United States must confront an uncomfortable truth. If the objective is to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, then regime change is not an option—it is a necessity.

The obvious objection is the cost. A full-scale intervention in Iran could result in significant American casualties, with potentially severe political consequences at home. A prolonged and bloody conflict could reshape the US political landscape, empowering opponents of the administration and undermining its broader strategic agenda.

But this is where the nature of modern warfare matters. The United States is no longer limited to the models of Iraq or Afghanistan. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how drones, robotics, and precision systems can dramatically alter the battlefield, allowing for high-impact operations with comparatively lower human cost. If applied effectively, these technologies could enable the United States to pursue regime change in Iran while minimising casualties and shortening the duration of the conflict.

Some level of ground deployment would still be required. However, the scale and risk of such a commitment could be significantly reduced. The objective would not be long-term occupation, but rapid destabilisation of the regime followed by a swift transfer of power.

This is where Iran differs from Iraq. Unlike Iraq in 2003, Iran possesses a recognisable alternative leadership figure in the form of Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi. A transitional government under his leadership could provide the political bridge needed to stabilise the country quickly, allowing US forces to withdraw before becoming entangled in a prolonged occupation.

Critics will inevitably invoke Iraq as a cautionary tale. Yet this comparison is often oversimplified. The United States did not fail in Iraq because it sought to transform the political system; it struggled because of the complexity of managing sectarian dynamics under intense domestic political pressure. In fact, the eventual transition to a representative system—supported by key figures such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani—demonstrated that a carefully managed political restructuring was possible.

The real lesson from Iraq is not to avoid intervention altogether, but to execute it more decisively and more efficiently. A drawn-out, hesitant approach invites both domestic backlash and strategic failure.

This is particularly relevant in the current American political context. A costly or indecisive campaign in Iran could erode support within the Republican base and create an opening for political opponents. Conversely, a rapid and successful operation—enabled by advanced military technology and followed by a clear exit strategy—could sustain domestic backing and reinforce American credibility.

For this to succeed, however, the political case must be made with clarity. The American public must understand that the stakes extend far beyond another Middle Eastern conflict. At issue is the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran and the cascading consequences that would follow.

If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the likelihood of a regional nuclear confrontation increases dramatically. Israel, facing an existential threat, may feel compelled to act pre-emptively. The result could be a catastrophic escalation with global implications.

The choice, therefore, is not between war and peace. It is between decisive action now and far greater danger later.

If the United States is serious about preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold, it must be prepared to pursue regime change—and to do so using the full range of modern military capabilities at its disposal. Anything less risks repeating the mistakes of the past, while allowing a far more dangerous future to take shape.

Synopsis
John Mulholland (1944–2026), long-time leader of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), was a principled political figure whose life combined professional achievement. A teacher, principal, psychologist, and accomplished self-represented litigant, he dedicated decades to shaping the DLP’s direction, particularly through electoral strategy and policy development. Though never elected to parliament, his influence on Australian political discourse—especially in labour rights, economic philosophy, and life issues—was significant. Social Action Australia (SAA) editor Dr. David Bennett honours his legacy and remains committed to advancing the principles he championed.

It is with sadness that Social Action Australia (SAA) reports the passing of John Mulholland (1944–2026), who died from pancreatic cancer in early April 2026. He was the long-time leader of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) and a man of distinction—a father and grandfather, and a professional who served as a teacher, school principal, psychologist, and self-represented legal litigant, notably winning an appeal before the Victorian Supreme Court.

While these facets of his life stand as testament to his character and achievements, this tribute focuses on his impact within the DLP, as SAA seeks to continue and build upon his political legacy.

John Mulholland’s association with what became the DLP began early. In 1955, he assisted his father in distributing how-to-vote cards for the newly formed Labor Party (Anti-Communist), which formally became the DLP in 1957. He later joined as a loyal rank-and-file member, regularly attending branch meetings.

During the 1960s, the DLP emerged as a significant “third force” in Australian politics, wielding influence through electoral preferences. By the 1970s, it held the balance of power in the Senate. However, after losing all Senate representation in the 1974 federal election and facing growing competition from the Australian Democrats from 1977, the party’s viability was questioned. A conference in March 1978 narrowly voted to dissolve the party.

This decision was challenged by former Senator Frank McManus, who reconvened a subsequent conference later that year to preserve the DLP. At this continuation conference, John Mulholland was elected Assistant Secretary, a role he held until becoming Party Secretary in 1984.

As Party Secretary, Mulholland applied a rigorous and strategic understanding of electoral preferencing, significantly influencing election outcomes. This was most evident during the July 1987 federal election, when DLP preferences played a crucial role in preventing the election of John Halfpenny to the Senate.

Mulholland believed strongly in the importance of the Senate as more than a house of review—it was, in his view, a chamber capable of shaping the philosophical direction of the nation. It was therefore a missed opportunity that he himself was not elected to the Senate in 1987, where he could have contributed meaningfully to national debate and policy.

He approached public policy through a distinct DLP framework, grounded in both economic and social principles. For example, he offered a nuanced interpretation of Adam Smith’s work, rejecting what he saw as a neo-classical misappropriation that justified anti-employee policies. Instead, he believed that market economics, properly understood, could generate both wealth and full employment, particularly through support for small business.

While a proponent of the market economy, Mulholland also strongly upheld the dignity of work. He believed that all workers were entitled to fair wages and conditions under robust employment laws. In this context, he would likely have opposed the Howard Government’s Work Choices legislation of 2005, which he would have viewed as undermining fundamental worker protections.

Under his leadership, the DLP maintained a strong commitment to labour values and trade unionism. However, Mulholland favoured a more traditional, craft-based model of unionism—one that allowed for greater participation by rank-and-file members.

Perhaps the most defining aspect of his public policy focus was his commitment to life issues. He was firmly opposed to abortion and euthanasia and consistently directed DLP electoral preferences toward pro-life candidates, even when doing so reduced his own electoral prospects.

Mulholland was also deeply concerned with international human rights, particularly in relation to China. He spoke out against the treatment of Tibetans and Uyghurs under the Chinese Communist Party and maintained an interest in broader foreign policy and defence issues, including Australia’s defence spending.

As an educator, he also contributed thoughtful perspectives on education policy, many of which remain relevant in the contemporary Australian context.

Although John Mulholland was never elected to parliament—despite contesting numerous federal and state elections and by-elections—he was, in every sense, an MP: a man of principle. The values he upheld and the ideas he developed through the DLP framework will continue to guide SAA as it works to preserve and advance his legacy.

Executive Summary

As Poland prepares for the possibility of a wider war, a deeper and more unsettling question emerges: what if the greatest threat is not only Russia’s military advance, but the political alliances it is quietly building across Europe?

This article explores how history may be repeating itself—from the partitions of Poland to the collapse of interwar Europe—and warns that today’s assumptions about NATO and European unity could prove dangerously misplaced. The piece, by Dr David Bennett, makes the case that the rise of nationalist forces in key countries like France and Germany may fundamentally reshape the continent’s ability to resist Russian influence.

With Ukraine at the centre of this unfolding crisis, it argues for bold, pre-emptive action—including the potential deployment of European troops to western Ukraine—not only to deter further aggression, but to defend the very foundations of European democracy.

If these warnings are ignored, the consequences may not simply echo history—they may recreate it.

It has been said that Poland is militarily preparing for an eventual Russian invasion should Putin succeed in conquering Ukraine. However, the assumption in Warsaw that a Russian-dominated Europe would still be prevented even if all of Ukraine were to fall to Moscow may prove erroneous. This is because the Russian Federation is currently cultivating tactical and strategic alliances in Europe with political parties which, should they come to power, may also seek to revise European borders in ways detrimental to nations such as Poland.

Poland has suffered from partitions before, most notably in 1795 and, most infamously, in 1939. Concerning the 1939 Soviet–Nazi partition, contrary to accepted wisdom, Poland put up effective resistance to the Nazi invasion and might have fought the Third Reich to a stalemate had the Soviet Union not treacherously invaded from the east. Indeed, had the Soviet Union invaded Poland alone in 1939, an argument could be made that Warsaw might have defeated Stalin.

The fundamental reason why the 1939 partition of Poland occurred so rapidly was the strategic alliance between revisionist powers—Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Today, the spectre of neo-revisionism is again emerging in Europe, with Putin’s Russia cultivating de facto alliances with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, as well as with hard-right nationalist parties in France and Germany.

Should Russian-backed nationalist forces come to power in France, Germany, or both, Poles would not need to be warned of the dire consequences for their nation. Under such circumstances, Poland would be unable to effectively counter future Russian aggression—regardless of how formidable its armed forces are—due to hostile revisionist alliances being constructed by Moscow.

Assumptions that NATO will automatically come to Poland’s defence may also prove misplaced if far-right nationalist parties gain power in key member states such as France and Germany. The futility of Poland relying on others was tragically illustrated in 1939, and this pattern could yet repeat itself.

It is often overlooked that Poland mobilised its armed forces in March 1936 in preparation to invade Germany following Hitler’s remilitarisation of the Rhineland. Such an invasion did not occur because France declined to support it. With the benefit of hindsight, Poland might have been justified in acting alone against a then comparatively weak Nazi Germany with the objective of facilitating regime change—an outcome that would have benefited not only Poland, but the world.

Today, Poland may again risk the fatal mistake of waiting for others when deciding whether to defensively deploy troops to western Ukraine. Such a deployment could be purely defensive in nature, undertaken in cooperation with—and with the consent of—Kyiv. It would send a powerful signal to Putin that any Russian advance into western Ukraine would be met by fresh Polish forces capable of halting further aggression.

For good measure, France should also be prepared to defensively deploy troops to western Ukraine. This would not only help block a westward Russian advance into Ukraine—and by extension into Europe—but also serve as a public policy initiative to reinforce the beleaguered political centre within France.

It should not be forgotten that since the July 2024 French legislative elections, the extreme right and extreme left together have held a parliamentary majority. This balance has been used by the far-right National Rally (RN) to bring down successive centrist minority governments.

Les Républicains, the modern successor to the Gaullist tradition, have acted honourably in refusing to enter into any alliance with the RN (although, alas, a hard-right breakaway party has chosen to do so). Whatever President Emmanuel Macron’s personal or political failings, Les Républicains have been correct to cooperate with his Renaissance Party and the Democratic Movement (MoDem) of former Prime Minister François Bayrou. This cooperation is both politically and ethically justified, as not only France’s democratic continuity is at stake, but also the survival of a democratic Europe.

The French Socialist Party (PS) can now follow the principled lead of its former rival by leaving the four-party New Popular Front and supporting President Macron. While it was tactically understandable for the PS to join this alliance to prevent an RN majority in 2024, the party’s relatively strong performance in the March 2026 local elections suggests it is now sufficiently robust to return unambiguously to the democratic centre.

Two of the four parties within the New Popular Front—Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s France Unbowed and the French Communist Party (PCF)—raise serious concerns regarding their democratic credentials. While Mélenchon has supported Ukraine, his party’s strident positions on other issues complicate the PS’s continued association. Both the PS and the Greens should consider leaving the alliance and instead entering into a parliamentary and electoral coalition with Renaissance, MoDem, and Les Républicains in the interests of French democracy and European unity. For good measure, the French Radicals—France’s oldest party and a politically moderate party—should also be included in such an expanded alliance.

President Macron should be supported not because he is beyond criticism, but because he is no Paul von Hindenburg—the German president who fatally undermined democracy by appointing Adolf Hitler as Chancellor in January 1933. Yet there are unsettling parallels between contemporary French politics and the final years of the Weimar Republic: a narrowing base for centrist parties, disunity among democratic forces, and a naïve belief that the extreme right can be contained or co-opted.

There also remains the challenge of reclaiming electoral support that has shifted to the RN. One possible response would be for a future French Government of Democratic Consolidation, together with Poland, to deploy troops to western Ukraine to form a defensive barrier against further Russian expansion. Such a policy would undoubtedly be opposed by the RN, thereby exposing its role in facilitating, whether directly or indirectly, a Russian-dominated Europe.

Highlighting Russia’s ambitions may also revive in France the memory of Europe’s darkest chapter—Hitler’s domination between 1940 and 1945—and help erode support for the RN. Although Putin’s imperial ambitions continue to be frustrated by Ukraine’s resistance, his broader strategy remains on track due to Moscow’s effectiveness in manipulating international relations.

Having once been victims of Hitler’s duplicity, France and Poland cannot now allow Ukraine to fall entirely to Putin. To do so would risk history repeating itself.

Arguments as to why the Trump administration cannot terminate ‘Operation Epic Fury’ prematurely and why Poland maybe the solution to saving Ukraine are advanced in this article by Dr. David Bennett

The Trump presidency is at a defining crossroads. Will Operation Epic Fury will be prematurely terminated?  Should President Trump prematurely terminate Operation Epic Fury with Iran still possessing the capacity to develop (and use) nuclear weapons either immediately or in the future then this military campaign might subsequently become known as ‘Operation Epic Failure’.  Iran’s clerical /military regime has already fired ballistic missiles reaching American military bases as far away as Diego Garcio (Chagos Archipelago)and reputedly has the capacity to fire ballistic missiles which could reach London.!

Consequently, for President Trump to now declare ‘victory` concerning the American air campaign against Iran with the regime still left in place along with its still formidable military, even in its current degraded state will be a colossal disaster for the United States and indeed the rest of  the world.  Additionally, that Iran still has the capacity to block. or at least disrupt, oil tankers moving through the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf demonstrates how dangerous the Tehran regime is to the global economy.  The global ramifications of an American defeat in Iran will therefore be profound because Putin’s Russia will be able to continue its war against Ukraine to a successful conclusion while mainland communist China will be emboldened to invade the Republic of China in Taiwan. These two aforementioned horrifying scenarios are plausible because an American defeat in Iran will be correctly perceived by Moscow and Beijing as fundamental signs of weaknesses and flawed public policy on the part of the Trump administration.

By contrast an expeditious landing of US marines in Iran to facilitate regime change will solve more problems then will be created. The precepts of the brilliant British general Orde Wingate (1903 to 1944) of landing troops, securing the targeted territory and then quickly withdrawing in favour of friendly forces can be applied to Iran by the United States. The United States could and should have applied a Wingate strategy in Indochina in the l960s in accordance with the counsel of the great US General Douglas Mac Arthur (1880 to 1964).

There are political dangers for the Trump administration concerning the despatching of US marines (‘boots on the ground’) to Iran because the Democrats will scaremonger that this will lead to another ‘forever war’. However, if a Wingate military strategy is applied by the Trump administration the United States could withdraw troops in the time for the 2026 mid-term congressional election campaign.  Even if a Wingate strategy is applied by the Trump administration the Democrats will of course scaremonger.  Already there are Democrats are calling into question whether Iran can actually develop nuclear weapons in an attempt to delegitimize Operation Epic Fury.   However, should this Democrat ‘anti-war` perspective prevail so that Operation Epic Fury becomes Operation Epic Failure, then American power around the world will be severely diminished Severely diminished due to the fundamental importance of the Persian Gulf to the global economy. 

The profound challenge which the Iran situation poses to Washington is heightened by the fact that Beijing and Moscow are strategically attempting to dominate the world at the expense of the United States.  Ironically while Putin’s Russia is far weaker than mainland communist China and the United States, Moscow is strategically ‘on track` to achieving its objective (in conjunction with Beijing) of a a change in the currently US dominated strategic and economic order. 

The strategic effectiveness of Putin’s Russia is evident if the contemporary politics of   contemporary Germany and France are analysed. Putin is having far more success than his communist predecessors ever did in relation to manipulating German politics.  Ironically, even though the Soviet Union fulfilled a vital role in defeating German Nazism in World War II, Russia is greatly influencing German politics via its covert support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) political party.

The AfD agenda and stated policy objective is to secure a closure of American military bases in Germany so that Berlin effectively withdraws from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite the avowed Marxism of Xi Jing Ping’s regime, the far-fight AfD is also aligning with Beijing regarding its desire to possibly invade the Republic of China in Taiwan.  Alas, the sinister foreign policy agenda of the AfD encompasses effective support for Putin’s attempt to conquer Ukraine!

Poland is a nation, which to say the least, should be concerned by the revival of a German far-right party which is strategically aligned with Moscow. Unfortunately, for the Poles their mainstay ally of France may in the next year (2027) fall to the pro-Putin far-right under the National Rally.  

It is therefore imperative that Warsaw move to save Ukraine before political events overtake Poland.  This can be achieved by Poland, in co-operation and with the consent of Kyiv, deploying troops to western Ukraine to initially assume defensive positions. Should Russians troops therefore reach western Ukraine then Putin will know that his forces will have to fight Poland with the prospect of defeat being a real possibility. Ideally, other European NATO nations beside Poland, such as Finland and Sweden, should also promptly deploy to western Ukraine, but because time is of the essence, Warsaw should consider going it alone.

For Poland is a nation which has often been defeated by time. This was the case in September 1939 when Britain and France failed to promptly come to Poland’s effective rescue by launching an invasion of Germany within the first fortnight of hostilities as the Poles initially held off against the Nazis.  That is not to say that Poland has not previously successfully confronted the Russian threat alone. During the Russo-Polish War (1919 to 1921) Poland effectively saved Europe from the Russian communist threat by brilliantly winning the vital Battle for Warsaw (‘The Miracle on the Vistula`) in August 1920. However, the Ukrainians are now reaching a point where they can no longer alone fight the Russians in combat without ‘boots on the ground’ from neighbouring countries such as Poland.

The post-Cold War world is a confronting one due to regimes such as a would be nuclear armed Iran and Putin’s Russia not being prepared to operate within rational boundaries. These two regimes present the world with a profound challenge which has not been seen since the rise of the far-right in Europe in the 1930s.  However, it cannot be said that the Trump administration and European nations (particularly Poland) should not now know what to do.

Dr David Bennett argues that the Trump administration should consider the option of despatching American troops to Iran to facilitate regime change.  In this article Dr Bennett advocates that Anerican troops be deployed according to the precepts of the late British general, Orde Wingate. 

The current military action undertaken by the United States and Israel against Iran is necessary because Tehran was on the brink of developing nuclear weapons.  This was inspite of the fact that the United States had bombed three Iranian nuclear enrichment plants in June 2025 as part of 'Operation Midnight Hammer`.  Therefore had the United States not launched its bombing campaign (‘Operation Epic Fury`) in late February 2026 then Iran would have developed nuclear weapons which it probably would have used against Israel.

Indeed, should Operation Epic  Fury be prematurely terminated by the United States with the clerical/miltary regime in Tehran left  in place, then Iran might still be able to proceed to develop nuclear weapons!   Consequently, the objectives of Operation Epic Fury should be expanded to encopass regime change in Iran by the United States sending in ground troops (‘boots on the ground`) to expiate such an outcome.  President Trump as a neo-isolationist leader is inherently loathe to take US military action outside of ‘America’s backyard`.  However, had President Trump not approved  Operation Epic Fury, then Iran would have possessed and subsequently used nuclear weapons against Israel.  Future historians will hence judge that President Trump not only acted correctly by initiating  Operation Epic Fury but that under the circumstances he had no choice but to do so.  

The question therefore remains as to whether the United States will expand the objective of Operation Epic Fury by quickly despatching American troops to Iran to dislodge the regime and then expeditiously withdraw once this has been achieved.   At the moment the military advantage is with the Iranian regime of the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khameini.  This is becasue the United States and Israel will relatively soon exhaust their stockpiles of misiles which they are using in Operation Epic Fury.  

The impending exhaustion of American missile stockpiles is also putting paid to any notion that the United States or its allies will supply Ukraine with the weapons which the Ukrainians need to stop Russia from eventually overrunning their nation.  It is therefore a matter of urgency that European NATO nations despatch troops to western Ukraine to deter the Russian Federation from advancing into that part of Ukraine.  If it is beyond realms of possibilty that European NATO nations will act collectively to save Ukraine (and therefore themselves from future Russian expansionism) then Finland, Poland and Sweden could do so by militarily entering western Ukraine to deter Vladimir Putin from continuing his westward advance.   Time is therefore of the essence with regard to European nations acting to save Ukraine.

Concerning the factor of time, all the Iranian regime has to do is wait it out until the American missile supply is exhausted and to be in a position to crush any post-bombing internal revolutionary uprising.  Given the the decntralised command structure of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, combined with their mobility, these security forces will be in a position to adapt to maintain the regime once the US led aerial bombing campaign has ended. This adaptability of the regime has already been demonstrated by the speed in which Mojtaba Khameini suceeded his father Ayotollah Ali Khameini after he was killed in an Ameircan aerial bombing at the commencement of Opertion Epic Fury.  The American expectation that the Iranian regime would disintegrate from within by killing Ayotollah Khmeinin has not been met.  Furthermore, the American hope that Revolutionary Guard commanders would defect or refrain from supporting the gvenrment has not yet, and probably will not evenuate given the regime’s ideological and stratgic cohension.

There is the option of the United States and Israel funneling arms to anti-regime ethnic minorities such as the Arabs, Baluchis and  Kurds as well as to the Iraninan people themselves .  However, an internal rebellion willl take too much time to come to fruition with regard to achieveing the regime’s ouster.  Indeed, time is of the essence with Mojaba Khameini’s regime now effectively blocking the narow Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf through which over twenty-percent of the world’s oil passes.  The resulting economic disrupiton to the world’s economy (as already reflected by higher oil prices) is another factor which necessitates that American troops be quickly despatched to Iran to help facilitate regime change.  While higher oil prices are a short-term ramification of the clerical-military regime staying in place there are wider ramifications which imperil the viablity of the United States if regime change is not achieved in Iran.

The wider ramifications of an American failure to achieve regime change in Iran will be to embolden mainland China to invade the Republic of China in Taiwan due to a lack of American resolution becoming apparent.  It should also be pointed out at this juncture that should there be a regime change in Iran, that leverage to prevent a Chinese communist regime’s invasion of Taiwan will be tremendously expanded because over ninety percent of mainland China’s oil goes through the Strait of Hormuz. The United State also must take care to ensure the American dollar remains the currency with which American Treasury bonds are purchased.  BRICS nations are already trying to arrange that there be an alternative currency to the American dollar for the buying and selling of oil transactions in order to bankrupt the United States. Having a post- clerical regime in Tehran will consequently invaluably help anchor the oil-producing Gulf nations in the pro-American camp by ensuring that oil transactions remain denominated in American dollars so that the United States remains financially solvent. 

 Due to the stakes being so high with regard to facilitating regime change in Tehran, the policy option of the United States sending combat troops into Iran must be seriously considered by the Trump administration.  The adoption of such a policy will invariably raise the spectre of another so-called ‘forever war` which could cause the Democrats to unfortunately win the crucial November 2026 mid-term congressional elections.  However, if the ideas of the late British general, Orde Wingate (1903 to 1944) are applied by the United States to the current Iran context, then a quagmire can be avoided.  The essence of General Wingate’s ideas were that flexiblity and mobility be assiduosly applied to a military context.  Under the Wingate paradigm American troops could be landed to fight in Iran so that once their military objective had been achieved, they could be speedily withdrawn.   The vaccum could be soon filled by US and Isreali armed Iranians who are opposed to the clerical-military regime. 

The application of the Wingate type military strategy by the United States in Iran will entail a pardigmatic shift in US military strategy.  It should not however be forgotten that perhaps the greatest twentieth century US army general, Douglas Mac Arthur, had warned President Kennedy against deploying combat troops to Indo-China on a permanent basis.  With the considerable benefit of hindsight American troops could have been deployed to Indochina on a combat needs only basis before expeditiously withdrawaring to US warships off the coast. It is only a matter of willpower that this Wingate type of military strategy be applied by the United States so that by the second half of 2026 there are no American troops stationed in an Iran which is free from a very dangerous world-threatening dictatorship.   

It is only a matter of willpower that this Wingate military type of strategy be applied by the United States in Iran so that by the second half of 2026 there are no American troops stationed in an Iran which is free from a very dangerous world-threatening dictatorship.